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AbstractA group decision support system is required on a value-based decision because there are different concern 
caused by differing preferences, experiences, and background. It is to enable each decision-maker to evaluate and rank the 
solution alternatives before engaging into negotiation with other decision-makers. Stakeholder of multi-criteria decision 
making problems usually evaluates the alternative solution from different perspective, making it possible to have a 
dominant solution among the alternatives. Each stakeholder needs to identify the goals that can be optimized and those that 
can be compromised in order to reach an agreement with other stakeholders. This paper presents group decision model 
involving three decision-makers on the selection of suitable system for a building’s roof. The objective of the research is to 
find an agreement options model and coalition algorithms for multi person decision with two main preferences of value 
which are function and cost. The methodology combines value analysis method using Function Analysis System Technique 
(FAST); Life Cycle Cost analysis, group decision analysis method based on Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) in a 
satisfying options, and Game theory-based agent system to develop agreement option and coalition formation for the 
support system. The support system bridges theoretical gap between automated design in construction domain and 
automated negotiation in information technology domain by providing a structured methodology which can lead to 
systematic support system and automated negotiation. It will contribute to value management body of knowledge as an 
advanced method for creativity and analysis phase, since the practice of this knowledge is teamwork based. In the case of 
roof system selection, it reveals the start of the first negotiation round. Some of the solutions are not an option because no 
individual stakeholder or coalition of stakeholders desires to select it. The result indicates the alternative solution that will 
be the best-fit solution. In this problem, a space frame system is the ‘best-fit’ solution for the roof system.  
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AbstrakSistem pendukung keputusan kelompok sangat diperlukan dalam proses pengambilan keputusan berbasis nilai, 
sebagaimana karakteristik keilmuan Manajemen Nilai yang didasarkan pada kelompok kerja multi disiplin. Karenanya ada 
perbedaan pertimbangan bagi setiap pengambil keputusan sebagai akibat dari perbedaan preferensi, pengalaman, dan latar 
belakang. Pada sistem tersebut sangat dimungkinkan setiap pengambil keputusan untuk mengevaluasi solusi alternatif sebelum 
terlibat dalam negosiasi dengan pengambil keputusan yang lain. Evaluasi alternatif pada pengambilan keputusan dengan 
multi-kriteria biasanya dari perspektif yang berbeda, tanpa adanya solusi yang dominan diantara pengambil keputusan. 
Sehubungan kepentingan untuk mendapatkan persetujuan dari pengambil keputusan yang lain, setiap pengambil keputusan 
perlu untuk mengidentifikasi tujuan yang akan dioptimalkan dan yang dapat dikompromikan. Paper ini menyajikan model 
pengambilan keputusan bersama sebagai sistem pendukung dengan tiga pengambil keputusan pada proses pemilihan sistem 
atap bangunan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk mendapatkan model pilihan persetujuan dan algoritma koalisi dengan dua 
kriteria yaitu kriteria fungsi dan kriteria biaya. Metode yang digunakan mengkombinasikan metode analisa nilai, analisa 
pengambilan keputusan kelompok, dan teori permainan berbasis sistem agen. Metode pertama menggunakan analisa biaya 
siklus hidup dan analisa fungsi, metode kedua menerapkan Proses Hirarki Analitik, dan metode ketiga digunakan untuk 
mengembangkan opsi persetujuan algoritma koalisi untuk membangun sistem pendukung keputusan. Sistem yang diusulkan 
akan menjembatani perbedaan antara teori otomatisasi desain di dalam domain konstruksi dan otomatisasi negosiasi di 
keilmuan teknologi informasi, melalui penyajian metode yang terstruktur menuju penyusunan pendukung sistem dan 
otomatisasi negosiasi. Sistem yang dibangun akan memberi kontribusi pada lingkup keilmuan manajemen nilai sebagai metode 
mutakhir pada tahap kreativitas dan tahap analisis karena dasar keilmuan ini berbasis pada kerja kelompok. Pada kasus 
pemilihan sistem atap, pada tahap awal negosiasi, ditemukan ada beberapa alternatif yang bukan merupakan alternatif solusi 
karena tidak ada satu pengambil keputusanpun atau koalisi diantara mereka yang menginginkan alternatif tersebut. Hasil yang 
ada mengindikasikan solusi alternatif yang menjadi solusi terbaik bagi seluruh pengambil keputusan. Pada kasus di penelitian 
ini, konstruksi rangka ruang adalah solusi terbaik untuk sistem atap bangunan. 
 
Kata Kuncisistem pendukung, keputusan berbasis nilai, keputusan kelompok dan negosiasi, sistem atap 
 
2I. INTRODUCTION 
his paper provides an approach and develops a 
framework for multi person decision in a building 
system decision in a case of roof system selection. As a 
process involving multi disciplines and teamwork, a 
group decision becomes an important role in an element 
or a building system selection such as roof system. The 
framework is facilitated by the implementation of 
coalition formation and it will help to reduce cost and to 
improve value of building system decision in 
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construction projects. Many researchers suggested 
applying Game Theory in multi person decision support 
[1]. However, the support model with value criteria has 
not been developed. The characteristic of value criteria 
cannot be applied to previous research. Existing models 
that are commonly accepted are optimization-based 
models, for example aggregation methods, but these are 
not able to solve the problem of value criteria [2]. This 
research applies the satisfying game method where 
function and cost of solution techniques as value criteria 
can be formulated on coalition algorithms [3]. 
The roof is one of the most important systems in a 
building. No one roofing system meets every buildings 
needs, which is why there are so many varieties from 
which to choose as the correct one for their building [4].  
Support System Model for Value based Group 
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Emerging roof technologies complicate product 
selection. These products may provide performance 
improvements and cost-saving benefits initially as well 
as during the life of the roof. Smith argues that knowing 
what technologies to consider and what roofing applica-
tions are best-suited for particular buildings makes 
selection a complex matter [5]. Identifying the right sys-
tem is important for either roofing a new building or re-
roofing an existing structure [6]. In new design, the roof 
system selection can be part of the building design, for 
example, the building can be strengthened to support a 
heavy roof system. 
The selection process in this case is difficult because of 
the large number of factors, many of which are unrelated 
or in conflict with one another, and the lack of key data 
(such as realistic design service life). The weight of roof 
system selection criteria depend on the perspective of the 
individual decision-makers [7], for example the architect 
might be more interested in the image of the building 
function that will be influenced by the roof system, 
whereas the project manager or facility manager would 
be more interested in domain issues related to the owner 
and constraints such as budget that reflected on initial 
cost. This makes it difficult for the decision-makers to 
agree on the evaluation criteria. 
With a general understanding of the available system 
options, consideration of the following technical and 
non-technical criteria can lead to the selection of the 
most appropriate system and details for a project. The 
criteria and alternatives of the roof system selection in 
this paper are determined from Focus Group research on 
the group decision maker in a private developer company 
in Indonesia. There are three decision makers involved 
which are Architect as Stakeholder 1 (SH1), Facility 
Manager as Stakeholder 2 (SH2) and Project Manager as 
Stakeholder 3 (SH3). These criteria include initial cost, 
maintenance cost, replacement cost, support system, 
usability period, functional performance, reliability, and 
image. The first three criteria pertain to cost whereas the 
other five are relevant to function. It is critical that the 
selected system sufficiently satisfies all of the criteria. 
There are five possible technical solutions for the roof 
system of the building to be selected and evaluated on 
eight criteria, by three decision-makers. The alternatives 
of technical solution are: 
1. Steel structure: steel structure system is one of the 
basic methods used in the construction of building 
roofs, 
2. Pre-cast system: apart from cast in situ concrete 
structures, building roofs can also be assembled 
from pre-cast members, 
3. Timber system: traditionally timber framework is 
also used for roof systems, 
4. Cast in situ reinforced concrete and 
5. Space frame: a space frame or space structure is a 
truss-like, lightweight rigid structure constructed 
from interlocking struts in a geometric pattern. 
Space frames usually utilize a multidirectional span, 
and are often used to accomplish long spans with 
few supports. Space frames are an increasingly 
common architectural technique especially for large 
roof spans in modernist commercial and industrial 
buildings [8]. 
A. Value-based Decision  
Value-based decision is an effort of Value 
Management (VM) process [9]. It improves the value of 
a facility through identifying opportunities to remove 
unnecessary costs [10]. VM is a structured and analytical 
process that seeks to achieve value by identifying all 
necessary functions at the lowest cost, while maintaining 
with the required levels of quality and performance [11]. 
It also means that VM identifies and eliminates 
unnecessary cost based on function analysis [12]. 
Unnecessary cost is the nature of design process. VM has 
been widely adopted in many countries over several 
decades as a very effective tool to meet the increasing 
demands for value enhancement by clients [13]. 
The value based approach as new approach and 
methodology that involves using a multidisciplinary 
team including representatives of the owner, user, 
facility manager, and constructor [9]. The value analysis 
is an integrated full team approach [10, 14]. In the 
natural characteristic of construction, it means that a tool 
for decision team is necessary. Cooperation is the nature 
in team work on VM workshop [11]. That decision 
analysis techniques can then applied to determine the 
relative value of the alternative solutions for performing 
function [15]. Weighting and scoring technique are 
relevant in value analyses exercise where a decision 
needs to be made in selecting an option [16]. A paired 
comparison is held to determine the weighing to be given 
to each attribute [17]. Many studies in value-based 
decision apply multi criteria decision making, such as in 
assessment of exterior building wall, in material design 
of concrete and in a modification of value engineering in 
petrochemical industry [18-20]. 
B. Cooperative Group Decision  
Cooperative Game Theory concepts suited to 
decentralize multi task environment in a group decision 
[21]. Cooperative games are often defined in terms of a 
characteristic function which specifies the outcomes that 
each coalition can achieve for itself [22]. For some 
decision, outcomes are specified in terms of the total 
utility that a coalition can divide (transferable utility). 
For other decision, utility is nontransferable that the 
achievement of the coalition cannot be characterized by a 
single number [21]. A cooperative decision consists of 
two elements that are first a set of player N = {1,2,…, n}. 
Members of N run from 1 to n. The second is a 
characteristic function specifying the value created by 
different subsets of the decision makers. The 
characteristic function is a function denoted v that 
associates with every subset S of N, denoted v(S). In a 
cooperative game, it is a pair (N,v), where N is a finite 
set and v is a function that maps subsets of N to 
members. 
C. Coalition and Characteristic Function  
This research takes negotiation into consideration in 
which decision-makers may choose to cooperate by 
forming coalitions. Coalition has been used in many 
researches in multi person decision and negotiation and 
cooperative games such as for transmission planning in 
power system, for cooperative information agent-based 
systems, for COTS selection, and who proposed a 
coalition approach that identifies and builds sub optimal 
yet satisfying coalitions [23-27]. A coalition is any 
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subset NC  , or numbered collection of players in 
which there are n>1 players numbered 1, 2, ..., n and set 
of all the players N = {1,2,…n}. Coalition is formed by 
making binding agreements in order to benefit every 
member of the coalition so that all members might 
receive more than they could individually on their own. 
Since there are n2 possible subsets of N, there are n2
possible coalitions. If N= {1, 2} or coalitions with two 
members, the possible coalition are n2 = {0, 1, 2, 12}. In 
every coalition there is empty coalition that is a coalition 
made up of no members (the null set ) and a grand 
coalition N consisting of all the decision makers [27]. 
The benefit of a coalition can be quantified by 
characteristic function. The characteristic function of a 
coalition NC   is the largest guaranteed payoff to the 
coalition. A coalition structure is a means of describing 
how the players divide themselves into mutually 
exclusive coalitions. It can be described by a set 
 mSSSS ,.....,2,1 of the m coalition that is formed. 
A multi person decision and negotiation has coalition 
formation algorithms. The algorithms can also be 
classified into static and dynamic algorithms [28-29]. 
The general goal for coalition formation is to maximize 
utility, but the actual reasons for forming coalitions are 
normally different for different decision makers, and 
different decisions [22, 29]. There are three varieties of 
coalition formation models: the utility-based models [23, 
28], knowledge-based model [30-31] and combination 
based on both models by [26, 29]. Based on the 
characteristic function game this coalition formation 
includes three activities which are: generating coalition 
structure, solving the optimization problem in each 
coalition, and dividing payoff or the value of generated 
solution among agents in a fair and stable way so that 
agents are motivated to stay within the coalition structure 
rather than moving out [32]. Several ways of dividing 
payoffs have been proposed in many literatures [33]. 
II. METHOD 
The methodology for value-based group decision 
combines value-based processes, multi-criteria decision-
making process, and negotiation base coalition process 
[34]. Figure 1 represents these processes. It consists of 
three stages base on the process. The first two stages are 
referred to [35] and the last stage is based on coalition 
formation on Game Theory [1, 23].  
The selection of roof system in this paper undergoes 
the following steps: 
Stage 1: Determining the function and cost of each 
technical solution for roof system, 
Stage 2: Each decision maker sets the weight of each 
criterion (win condition). Using Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) [36], every decision 
maker evaluates and ranks the support bridge 
options based on his/her win conditions and, 
Stage 3: Identifying agreement options that reflect the 
combined preferences of all decision makers by 
coalition. Finally, determining the ‘best fit’ 
options for each coalition on first negotiation 
round. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Stage One: Value-based Process 
Value-based process is the first stage on developing of 
agreement option and coalition model in this paper [37]. 
The process of value-based consists of two main stages 
which are function analysis and LCC analysis. 
1. Function Analysis of Roof System  
Function analysis of the roof system is presented in 
Figure2. It is developed by team work based on the 
Function Analysis System Technique (FAST) method 
[12]. There are three basic functions, namely cost of 
technical solution, building life cycle support and work 
function. These are further divided into eight sub-
functions that will be used as the criteria to select roof 
system (F1-F8). Later, the functions are called c1, c2, c3, 
f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 respectively and refer to the 
satisfying model of value (function/cost). 
2. Life Cycle Cost of Roof System Alternatives  
Three cost drivers of the building system which are 
initial cost, maintenance cost and replacement cost were 
calculated. There is no salvage value on engineering 
economics practice in Indonesia. Table 1 presents the 
result of Life Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis and the pro-
portion for each category of initial cost (including invest-
ment cost), operation and maintenance (O&M) cost and 
replacement cost. O&M cost is calculated on a yearly 
basis. Replacement cost and has variability are calculated 
over the period of time. 
B. Stage Two: Multi-Criteria Decision Process  
The Process consists of three steps namely constructing 
decision hierarchy, making judgments and judgment 
synthesis, and satisfying of technical solutions on value 
criteria. The two first steps follow evaluation process on 
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [36]. The last step 
is the evaluation model proposed for this paper. Result 
on this process is the ‘best option’ of technical solution 
for roof system based on individual decision maker. The 
process to determine the ‘best option’ for group is dis-
cussed in next stage. 
1. First Step: Constructing Decision Hierarchy 
To obtain a good representation of a problem, it has to 
be structured into different components called activities. 
Figure 3 shows three levels of decision hierarchy. The 
goal of the problem (G =Select the best value of 
technical solution for roof system for an office building) 
is addressed by some alternatives (A = a1; a2; a3; a4; a5) 
which are steel structure, pre-cast system, timber system, 
reinforced concrete and space frame respectively. The 
sub-problems namely cost (LCC) and functions are split 
into eight evaluation criteria that will be used to select 
the best roof system solution. The evaluations criteria are 
c1, c2, c3, f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 or initial cost, 
maintenance cost, replacement cost, support system, 
usability period, functional performance, reliability, and 
image respectively. Then, implementation of AHP 
(Analytical Hierarchy Process) can be started with 
compilation of the hierarchy model. 
2. Second Step: Making Judgments and Synthesis 
The relative importance of pair-wise comparison of 
decision input could be: equal (1), moderate (3), strong 
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(5), very strong, demonstrated (7) or extreme (9) [36]. 
Sometimes one needs to compromise judgments (2; 4; 6; 
8) or reciprocal values (1/9; 1/8; 1/7; 1/6; 1/5; 1/4; 1/3; 
1/2). If there are n items that need to be compared in a 
given matrix, a total of n(n-1)/2 judgments are needed 
[36]. For each set of factors, a matrix A of pair-wise 
comparison can be derived. There are two judgments 
involved in this decision-the first is criteria judgment for 
each decision-maker and the second, technical solution 
judgment for each criterion. 
(1) Criteria judgments for each decision-maker 
Based on AHP process, the weighting factor of each 
criterion for each decision-maker is calculated. A set of 
tables (Table 2, 3, and 4) show the result of pair-wise 
comparisons of decision- makers. For example in this 
paper, data and analysis of the Architect is presented. 
Table 2 shows the preferences of the Architect in a 
form of pair-wise comparisons. Table 3 presents the 
weighting factor of each criterion based on the 
Architect’s preferences. From this table it can be 
concluded that the highest ranking of the criteria for 
Architect is image, and the lowest is initial cost. Table 
IIc shows the calculation of preference consistency on 
input judgment. The CR (Consistency Ratio) is 0.08. It is 
lower than 0.1, which suggests that the pair-wise input 
can be accepted [36]. The calculation and the 
relationship between CR, Consistency Index (CI), and 
largest eigenvalue (λ) are presented in Table 4. 
Using the same procedure presented in Table 2, 3, and 
4, the weighting factor of each criterion for the Facility 
Manager and Project Manager (PM) Client can be 
obtained. Table 5 and Figure 4 presents the result of 
criteria judgment for all decision-makers. 
The weight of each evaluation criteria for each 
decision-maker is different. The difference presents 
rationality among decision-maker. The results indicate 
that the architect and PM Client contrast in preferences. 
The architect argues that image is the most important 
criterion in roof system selection, whereas PM client 
puts initial cost as the highest priority on the decision of 
the roof system. 
(2) Technical solution judgment for each criterion 
The procedure and calculation for technical solution 
judgment is similar with criteria judgment. The goal of 
this process is to get the weighting factor of each 
technical solution option for each criterion. Table 6, 7, 
and 8 shows the judgment input, normalization and 
consistency respectively for criteria initial cost (c1). 
The results of the technical solution judgments for all 
criteria are presented in Figure 5. For example, it can be 
seen that for the criterion of initial cost (c1), option RC 
(a4) is the cheapest as compared to space frame (a5), 
which is the most expensive. Another example is the 
criteria of image (f5), where space frame (a5) is the 
highest priority. Steel (a1) is the best for the criteria of 
functional performance (f3) and reliability (f4). 
The goal of judgment synthesis is to get the ranking of 
the technical solution option for each decision maker. 
The procedure is presented in Table 9.  
3. Third Step: Satisfying Option on Value Criteria 
Stirling [3] has written and demonstrated satisfying 
games on multi-criteria decision-making. He writes that 
‘A natural procedure of satisfying options is to separate 
the attributes into two categories, one to involve the 
attribute that represents functions of an option and the 
other to involve attributes that represents losses’. 
Categorization of this problem is helpful in identifying 
initial, maintenance and replacement costs as ‘Cost’ and 
all five function of roof system as ‘Function’. To 
compare function and cost representing the value of a 
technical solution, they must be represented on the same 
scale. This may be done by creating select ability (Ps) 
and reject ability (Pr) functions [3] and normalizing the 
problem so that the decision-maker has a unit of function 
utility and a unit of cost utility to apportion among the 
options. The two last columns on Table 10 show the 
utility of cost and function for each option of technical 
solution. 
Based on the results presented in Table 10, Figure 5 
provides a cross plot of function and cost, with Pr (reject 
ability) the abscissa and Ps (select ability) the ordinate. 
The caution index, v, is taken as unity where the 
technical solution will be “select” or “reject” if the value 
(F/C) is >1 or <1 respectively. Observe that although a4 
has the lowest cost, it also has low function, and a 
rational decision-maker can legitimately conclude that 
this is satisfying, since the function at least outweighs the 
costs. Options a3 and a2 is easily eliminated by the cost-
function test. Options a4 here give the highest satisfying 
conclusion since it has high function to cost ratio as 
defined by [11]. 
Both the facility manager and project manager are 
likely to take into consideration the costs in their 
selections. While initial cost is a factor in their decision-
making process, it is not the only factor. On the other 
hand, the architect considers function in their selection. 
Figure 7, 8, and 9 provide a cross plot of function and 
cost of each decision-maker. 
Observe that the preference value of the decision-
makers will impact on the value of the technical solution. 
The example given here is a5 that has a value greater 
than F/C=1 (to select) on the basic value (Figure 5), but 
will decrease to less than F/C=1 (to reject) on PM 
Client’s preference (Figure 8). This also happens with 
a2, in which the architect (Figure 6) gives it a value 
greater than F/C=1 (to select), but the Facility Manager 
(Figure 7) and Project Manager (Figure 8) decide to 
reject. 
C.  Stage Three: Negotiation base Coalition Process  
In this multi person decision with three stakeholder 
(Architect, Facility Manager and Project Manager) there 
were 8 possible (23) coalitions, including empty coalition 
and five singleton coalitions. Agreement options are 
determined by conducting five stages, which are; 
1. Determining the weighting factor of criteria for each 
decision-maker and the aggregation, 
2. Grading of alternative for each evaluation criteria, 
3. Scoring of each alternative for every decision-maker,  
4. Determining the optimal solution (payoff optimum) 
and 
5. Determining the fitness factor of an alternative 
solution 
The first three steps came from individual decision 
presented in [7]. The results from these first three steps 
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1. Determining the Optimal Solution (Payoff Optimum) 
The determination of the optimal solution for each 
decision-maker in a coalition is based on a cooperative 
multi-person games with complete information in which 
coalition-formation among sub-group members are 
allowed [22, 38, 39]. In the context of Game Theory, 
they [38-40] presented a proof that the formation of 
coalitions among decision-maker provides a means for 
achieving Pareto optimality. Coalition formation leads to 
an objective function for each decision maker in 
coalition Rj, where fi(x) is the payoff of decision-maker i 
and gRj(x) is the payoff of coalition Rj, for i Rj. The 
variable x in the function of the payoff of decision-
makers stands for the criteria to be evaluated for the 
alternative solutions. Therefore, decision-maker i Rj
 maximizes gRj(x) instead of fi(x) [26]. For every coalition 
structure, decision-maker payoffs are determined by 
assuming that a rational stakeholder i Rj chooses an 
alternative for the group. 
Bialas [38] and Wanyama [26] showed that for any 
imputation  N ,....,, 21 , where i the payoff of 
decision-maker i is, therefore i satisfies the following 
Equations:  
 PwiPi     
and 
GiNi U         
 (1)    
A linear programming formula is used to determine the 
Pareto optimal payoff for each decision-maker in each 
coalition. A linear programming on Game Theory is used 
to determine the payoff players in a coalition [26, 41]. 
Objective function of the linear programming is min β, 
where β
 
is a measure of deficit that a coalition may 
suffer during the distribution of resource (UG) with pre-
emptive priority, which are total payoff of coalition (P1) 
and function of goal constraint every scenario (P2). The 
value of P2 comes from mathematical model of styles 
and outcomes correlation [7]. There are five constraints. 
The first constraint ensures that the total earning of 
decision-makers is equal to the available resources. The 
second constraint ensures that no decision-maker earns 
less than what it can obtain when acting alone. Wanyama 
[26] clearly argued that the reason being that if the 
decision-maker receives an amount i < Smin(i), it simply 
reject the solution and at worst, earn Smin(i). The third 
constraint minimizes the deficit of any coalition. The 
fourth constraint is number of coalition member, and the 
last constraint ensures that summation of functional 
scenario higher than dysfunctional scenario on the 
mathematical model of negotiation styles and outcomes 
correlation [37].  
Based on the linear programming equation, two kinds 
of Pareto Optimum payoff can be determined. They 
represent the value criteria namely COST payoff 
optimum and function payoff optimum. The process to 
determine payoff optimum for ‘Cost’ and ‘Function’ is 
presented on Table 11 and 12, respectively. 
The payoff optimum refers to each decision maker in 
each coalition. The value of (max-min) payoff for a 
decision maker is used to determine the payoff optimum 
by applying the coordinating scenario. This means that 
no one stakeholder has higher importance than others. 
This scenario can be changed depending on the situation 
of a project. 
2. Determining the Fitness Factor of an Alternative 
Solution 
The linear programming formulation yields a Pareto 
optimal solution with imputation  = (1, 2,.....,N) [42, 
43]. Therefore, there are two parameters to determine the 
best option, which are the negative value and positive 
value. Wanyama [29] determined these values by 
comparing decision-maker’s payoffs with Pareto 
optimum. Adapted from [26, 42-44], Figure 10 is the 
process of fitness factor. The process is applied to both 
value criteria namely function and cost. There are two 
categorize of best options which are best for function and 
best for cost. Based on the two categorize, a best option 
for all stakeholder can be determined by value equation 
which is Function/Cost. For both value criteria, the best 
selectable option is the one with the least negative value. 
However, if two alternatives have the same negative 
value, then the one with higher positive value of is better. 
The rationale is come from [26, 29] that if the negative 
value is close to zero, then most decision-makers earn a 
payoff close to their Pareto optimum. A high negative 
value means that some decision-makers earn higher than 
their Pareto optimum. Sets of activities could move, 
expand and retract during negotiation [1]. When a 
decision maker takes a new alternative, it is purposed to 
all users. When a new criterion is taken by a decision-
maker, this criterion is proposed to the corresponding 
group.  
The coalition formation model worked in the context of 
multi-criteria group decision-making. Firstly, indivi-
dually all decision-makers have their own best solution. 
Finally, as shown on Table 13, space frame (a5) is found 
to be the ‘best fit’ solution for all decision-makers after 
coalition. As the ‘best fit’ solution, a1 is contrary to the 
best option selected by the project manager and facility 
manager, who chose a5. On the process of trade off, the 
project manager and facility manager can propose a new 
preference if he or she did not accept a5 as the best 
option. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Firstly, this section presents an overall conclusion of 
the research. This is followed by a brief description on 
the limitation of the support system model developed in 
this research and a brief account of future work in the 
areas of multi-criteria multi-person decision making and 
its automated system in the domain of value-based 
decision, operation research, and agent-based negotiation 
and technology. 
A. General Conclusion 
The coalition table (Table 13) reveals the start of the 
first negotiation round. Some of the solutions will not 
become an option if no individual stakeholder or 
coalition of stakeholders desires to select it. In this case, 
alternative solution a2 and a3 was not an option. And the 
table indicates the alternative solution that will be the 
best-fit solution. In this problem, in the first negotiation 
round, a5 was the ‘best-fit’ solution. Stakeholder of 
multi-criteria decision making problems usually 
evaluates the alternative solution from different per-
spective, making it possible to have a dominant solution 
among the alternatives. Each stakeholder needs to 
identify the goals that can be optimized and those that 
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can be compromised in order to reach an agreement with 
other stakeholders. 
A ‘Value’ in Function/Cost is the basis for the metho-
dology presented on this paper. On the value-based 
process, function and life cycle cost are analyzed. On 
multi-criteria decision-making, a satisfying option is 
used by correlating the function and cost to get the value 
of a technical solution option. On multi person decision 
process, the payoff optimum and best fit options are 
based on the criterion of value, which are function and 
cost. In this proposed model, a multi person decision 
consists of exchange of proposals between decision-
makers. When decision-maker i proposes its alternative 
to decision-maker j, this alternative should be the most 
preferred alternative for decision-maker j (with the 
highest priorities with respect to the goal) to accept it 
immediately. If not, decision maker j tries to change the 
alternatives order of preference by adjusting judgments 
in pair-wise comparison matrices. If the proposal is not 
accepted, it will send a counter-proposal. Sets of acti-
vities could move, expand and retract during group 
decision process. 
B. Recommendation for Future Research 
The research was deliberately limited towards 
addressing the ‘value’ in the component of value for 
money. There are many issues relating to the difficulties 
of cost modeling which have not been addressed. The 
adopted research strategy is also open to criticism on the 
basis that it focused only on roof system selection. It is 
also important to point out that there are significant 
differences between the subjective interpretation of the 
researcher and an inter-subjective interpretation amongst 
the decision makers. Once the paradigm of positivist 
research is rejected, there is no longer any objective 
reality against which to measure validity. 
This paper has developed the theoretical and 
philosophical basis of negotiation support. There is 
considerable amount of work which remains to be done 
within the wider domains of building economics, 
construction management, operation research and agent-
based negotiation and technology. There is need for 
further research into the possible application of other 
methodologies of group decision support and negotiation 
support. In the domain of operation research, there are a 
lot of opportunities for mathematical proof research for 
optimization and satisfying decision in cooperative and 
incomplete information environments. A mathematical 
proof research for an unlimited multi-person decision 
maker in a project involving a whole community will be 
an interesting research. 
Future research in the field of agent-based negotiation 
and management will have a huge benefit from the 
development of a user-friendly software which uses a 
GUI (graphical user interface), but it will surely consume 
a lot of time and money for research. In future, the 
combination of many technologies such as Virtual 
Reality (VR) will help human and its agent to 
communicate, discuss and make decision for any type or 
stages of building system design with two main 
important preferences that are function and cost. As to 
further illustrate, a final building design decision can be 
made by an agent from all the project participants in a 
virtual reality environment simultaneously while being in 
a different geographical area.  
The recommended future works associated with the 
research reported in this paper are as follows: 
1. To integrate the support for elicitation process with 
technical solution selection. It needs to develop 
ontology of functional concept of building system 
product alternatives. At present, such ontology is not 
available. The work to develop ontology of functional 
concept has been started by [45] but until now 
researches in this area are still in its very preliminary 
stage. 
2. To extend the framework of technical solution to 
address the issue of selecting multiple building (roof) 
system products alternatives to perform the function. 
It will be run concurrently between satisfying games 
method to reduce the number of technical solution 
and optimization games method to select the best fit 
for the technical solutions. Research and practice in 
the objectives area of decision making science to 
reduce alternatives are still in the qualitative stages, 
such as advantage and disadvantages analysis, and 
benchmark analysis.  
3. To continue developing, modifying and testing the 
agent negotiation protocol of the support system and 
reasoning mechanism. Time constraint will be 
important criteria to be considered. 
4. To continue working on multi-attribute decision 
making, specifically on the process of eliciting user 
preference models such as neural network application 
and value function, and on establishing expert 
quantitative data from qualitative description of the 
feature of the alternative solution. It will need the 
development of trade off algorithms to analyze value 
of technical solution (roof system) in real time. 
5. To develop knowledge management properties on the 
model to store the selection data and information in 
various types of repositories such as system selection 
repository, user repository, discussion repository, 
lessons learn repository, and historical information 
repository. 
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Figure 3. Decision hierarchies for roof system selection 
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Figure 5. Weighting factor for each roof system option to each criteria 
 
 
Figure 6. Cross-plot of basic value of roof system solutions 
 




Figure 8. Cross-plot of Facility Manager’s value of roof system 
solutions 
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  jjjjG  ,Fitness 
factor: 
Payoff for 
stakeholder i for 
each alternative 
 
Q+ for Xij ≥ 0 
Q- for Xij < 0 
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TABLE 1. 
LCC OF ROOF SYSTEM  
Cost 
category 
Present Worth (1000USD) 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 
Initial 2600 1800 2500 3300 1500 
Maintenance 235 625 120 760 370 
Replacement 1115 3200 1600 4000 2100 
Total Cost 3950 5625 4220 8060 3970 
 
TABLE 2. 
PAIR-WISE COMPARISON OF ARCHITECT: JUDGMENT INPUT  
Criteria c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
(c1) initial cost 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.11 
(c2) maintenance cost 3 1 2 0.33 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.2 
(c3) replacement cost 3 0.5 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.2 
(f1) support system 3 3 3 1 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 
(f2) usability period 5 5 3 3 1 0.5 4 0.5 
(f3) functional performance 5 5 3 3 2 1 5 0.5 
(f4) reliability 5 4 4 3 0.25 0.2 1 0.33 
(f5) image 9 5 5 4 2 2 3 1 
∑ 34 23.83 21.33 15 6.32 4.77 14.03 3.09 
 
TABLE 3. 
PAIR-WISE COMPARISON OF ARCHITECT: NORMALIZATION  
Criteria c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 ∑ weight 
(c1) initial cost 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.03 
(c2) maintenance cost 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.40 0.05 
(c3) replacement cost 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.38 0.05 
(f1) support system 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.65 0.08 
(f2) usability period 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.29 0.16 1.41 0.18 
(f3) functional performance 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.21 0.36 0.16 1.74 0.22 
(f4) reliability 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.96 0.12 
(f5) image 0.26 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.42 0.21 0.32 2.25 0.28 
 
TABLE 4. 
PAIR-WISE COMPARISON OF ARCHITECT: CONSISTENCY 
Criteria c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 ∑  
(c1) initial cost 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.22 8.56 
(c2) maintenance cost 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.42 8.26 
(c3) replacement cost 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.39 8.23 
(f1) support system 0.08 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.69 8.56 
(f2) usability period 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.48 0.14 1.67 9.51 
(f3) functional performance 0.13 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.22 0.60 0.14 2.08 9.55 
(f4) reliability 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.09 1.07 8.85 
(f5) image 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.32 0.35 0.44 0.36 0.28 2.48 8.81 
         ∑ 70.33 
     CR 0.08 CI 0.11 λ 8.79 
 
TABLE 5. 
WEIGHTING FACTOR OF EACH CRITERION FOR EACH DECISION MAKER  
Stakeholders 
Cost Function 
c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
Architect and Design Team 
(λ=8.79, CI=0.11, CR=0.08) 
0.0256 0.0503 0.0479 0.0811 0.1205 0.2177 0.1204 0.2811 
Facility Manager 
(λ=8.65, CI=0.09, CR=0.06) 
0.0236 0.2189 0.2338 0.2010 0.1205 0.0989 0.0544 0.0489 
Project Manager (PM) Client 
(λ=8.74, CI=0.11, CR=0.07) 
0.4338 0.0815 0.0702 0.1225 0.0797 0.1539 0.0323 0.0261 
 
TABLE 6. 
PAIR-WISE COMPARISON FOR TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: JUDGEMENT INPUT 
 (c1) initial cost a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 
a1 (steel) 1 3 1 0.333333 5 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.333333 1 0.333333 0.166667 2 
a3 (timber) 1 3 1 0.333333 5 
a4 (RC) 3 6 3 1 7 
a5 (Space frame) 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.142857 1 
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TABLE 7. 
PAIR-WISE COMPARISON FOR TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: NORMALIZATION 
 (c1) initial cost a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 ∑ weight 
a1 (steel) 0.1807 0.2222 0.1807 0.1687 0.2500 1.0023 0.2005 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.0602 0.0741 0.0602 0.0843 0.1000 0.3789 0.0758 
a3 (timber) 0.1807 0.2222 0.1807 0.1687 0.2500 1.0023 0.2005 
a4 (RC) 0.5422 0.4444 0.5422 0.5060 0.3500 2.3848 0.4770 




PAIR-WISE COMPARISON FOR TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: CONSISTENCY 
 (c1) initial cost a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 ∑  
a1 (steel) 0.2005 0.2273 0.2005 0.1590 0.2316 1.0189 5.0825 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.0668 0.0758 0.0668 0.0795 0.0926 0.3816 5.0352 
a3 (timber) 0.2005 0.2273 0.2005 0.1590 0.2316 1.0189 5.0825 
a4 (RC) 0.6014 0.4547 0.6014 0.4770 0.3243 2.4587 5.1549 
a5 (Space frame) 0.0401 0.0379 0.0401 0.0681 0.0463 0.2325 5.0199 
       25.3750 




JUDGMENT SYNTHESIS AND RANKING OF ROOF SYSTEM SOLUTIONS FOR EACH DECISION MAKER  
Architect 
Weighting factor each option to each criteria for Architect 
c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
Weight Rank 
(0.026) (0.050) (0.048) (0.081) (0.176) (0.218) (0.120) (0.281) 
a1 (steel) 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.036 0.089 0.044 0.038 0.240 2
nd
 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.002 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.042 0.026 0.028 0.064 0.196 4
th
 
a3 (timber) 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.011 0.012 0.034 0.018 0.022 0.110 5
th
 
a4 (RC) 0.012 0.024 0.019 0.003 0.066 0.016 0.017 0.049 0.206 3
rd
 




Weighting factor each option to each criteria for Facility Manager 
c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
Weight Rank 
(0.024) (0.219) (0.234) (0.201) (0.121) (0.099) (0.054) (0.049) 
a1 (steel) 0.005 0.017 0.015 0.053 0.025 0.041 0.020 0.007 0.180 4
th
 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.002 0.061 0.067 0.012 0.029 0.012 0.013 0.011 0.207 3
rd
 
a3 (timber) 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.027 0.008 0.016 0.008 0.004 0.103 5
th
 
a4 (RC) 0.011 0.104 0.092 0.007 0.045 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.283 1
st
 
a5 (Space frame) 0.001 0.026 0.036 0.101 0.013 0.024 0.006 0.019 0.226 2
nd
 
Project Manager Client 
Weighting factor each option to each criteria for PM Client 
c1 c2 c3 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
Weight Rank 
(0.434) (0.081) (0.070) (0.122) (0.080) (0.154) (0.032) (0.026) 
a1 (steel) 0.087 0.006 0.004 0.032 0.016 0.063 0.012 0.004 0.224 2
nd
 
a2 (pre-cast) 0.033 0.023 0.020 0.007 0.019 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.134 5
th
 
a3 (timber) 0.087 0.004 0.007 0.017 0.005 0.024 0.005 0.002 0.152 4
th
 
a4 (RC) 0.207 0.039 0.028 0.005 0.030 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.328 1
st
 






BASIC VALUE OF ROOF SYSTEM OPTIONS  
 
Cost Function Normalization 
c1 c2 c3 Σ Loss f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 
Cost 
(Pr) Function (Ps) 
a1 0.200 0.077 0.062 0.340 1.324 0.262 0.204 0.410 0.364 0.135 0.249 0.275 
a2 0.076 0.278 0.286 0.641 1.023 0.060 0.241 0.120 0.233 0.229 0.192 0.177 
a3 0.200 0.050 0.106 0.356 1.307 0.136 0.068 0.158 0.149 0.078 0.246 0.118 
a4 0.477 0.474 0.393 1.344 0.320 0.037 0.376 0.074 0.144 0.174 0.060 0.161 
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TABLE 11. 
COST PAYOFF OPTIMUM FOR THE OF EACH STAKEHOLDER IN EACH COALITION 
Coalition Alternatives Payoff Optimum i0  
SH1+2+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.261 0.177 0.257 0.057 0.248 0.204 0.261 
SH2 0.280 0.153 0.274 0.049 0.243 0.231 0.280 
SH3 0.220 0.242 0.219 0.041 0.278 0.236 0.229 
∑ 0.761 0.572 0.750 0.147 0.769   
SH1+2 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.261 0.177 0.257 0.057 0.248 0.204 0.261 
SH2 0.280 0.153 0.274 0.049 0.243 0.231 0.280 
∑ 0.541 0.330 0.532 0.106 0.492   
SH1+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.261 0.177 0.257 0.057 0.248 0.204 0.261 
SH3 0.220 0.242 0.219 0.041 0.278 0.236 0.265 
∑ 0.481 0.419 0.476 0.098 0.526   
SH2+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH2 0.280 0.153 0.274 0.049 0.243 0.231 0.280 
SH3 0.220 0.242 0.219 0.041 0.278 0.236 0.241 
∑ 0.500 0.395 0.493 0.090 0.521   
 
TABLE 12. 
PARETO (PAYOFF) OPTIMUM FOR THE FUNCTION OF EACH STAKEHOLDER IN EACH COALITION  
Coalition Alternatives Pareto Optimum i0  
SH1+2+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.264 0.186 0.114 0.159 0.277 0.163 0.277 
SH2 0.275 0.147 0.120 0.146 0.312 0.191 0.298 
SH3 0.306 0.141 0.128 0.133 0.292 0.178 0.306 
∑ 0.845 0.474 0.362 0.438 0.880   
SH1+2 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.264 0.186 0.114 0.159 0.277 0.163 0.277 
SH2 0.275 0.147 0.120 0.146 0.312 0.191 0.312 
∑ 0.540 0.333 0.234 0.305 0.588   
SH1+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH1 0.264 0.186 0.114 0.159 0.277 0.163 0.277 
SH3 0.306 0.141 0.128 0.133 0.292 0.178 0.293 
∑ 0.570 0.327 0.242 0.292 0.569   
SH2+3 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 (max-min) Optimum 
SH2 0.275 0.147 0.120 0.146 0.312 0.191 0.298 
SH3 0.306 0.141 0.128 0.133 0.292 0.178 0.306 
∑ 0.581 0.288 0.248 0.279 0.603   
 
TABLE 13. 
BEST TECHNICAL SOLUTION OPTIONS (ALTERNATIVE) FOR EACH COALITION  
Coalition 
Technical Solution Options (Alternative) 
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 
f c f C F c f c f c 
Grand w- 14.75 5.20 139.02 87.91 172.80 319.91 151.34 208.12 8.08 22.46 






















SH1+2 w- 117.03 0.00 133.24 107.67 177.55 5.10 144.01 217.92 0.00 27.50 






















SH1+3 w- 9.19 32.53 125.27 61.58 164.00 32.65 140.58 214.23 0.71 8.49 






















SH2+3 w- 15.56 14.85 157.63 89.80 177.50 16.12 162.84 216.06 9.90 26.16 
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